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INHERENT INCOMPATIBILITY DOCTRINE CIRCLES THE DRAIN IN
KNEPPER v. RITE AID CORP.: “HYBRID” WAGE & HOUR
CLAIMS FLOAT IN THIRD CIRCUIT
CHAD ODHNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The finest distinctions in procedural minutiae can make all the differ-
ence in the real world.1  For example, when a group of employees sues an
employer for unpaid wages, the size of the certified group can vary wildly
depending on whether the claim is brought under federal or state law.2
Similarly situated employees cannot join a collective action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) unless they affirmatively “opt in.”3  In con-
trast, similarly situated employees are automatically joined in class actions
brought under most state wage-and-hour laws unless they affirmatively
“opt out.”4
Federal courts have had some difficulty reconciling these two proce-
dures, especially when FLSA and state law actions are filed at the same
time in combined, or “hybrid,” actions in federal court.5  Courts have dis-
agreed over whether the specified opt-in procedure in the FLSA should
bar federal jurisdiction over a corresponding state law claim governed by
the opt-out procedure of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23).6
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law.  I would like to
thank the staff of the Villanova Law Review—in particular Glenn McGillivray and
Megan Lagreca—for their tireless effort in bringing this article to publication.  I
would also like to thank my wife for her constant moral and logistical support
during the writing process and throughout our 10 years of marriage.
1. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1442 (2010) (acknowledging that procedural rules often significantly affect sub-
stantive outcomes).
2. William F. Allen, Defending Employers in Complex Wage and Hour Litigation, in
STRATEGIES FOR EMPLOYMENT CLASS & COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON
ADDRESSING TRENDS IN WAGE AND HOUR ALLEGATIONS AND DEFENDING EMPLOYERS IN
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 71, 83 (2012), available at 2012 WL 5900370 (noting
“dramatically opposite” participation rates depending on which classification pro-
cedure is employed).
3. For a discussion of the FLSA’s opt-in procedure, see infra notes 29–30 and
accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of Rule 23’s opt-out procedure, see infra notes 31–32 and
accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the dilemma in federal courts, see infra notes 33–34 and
accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Rachel K. Alexander, Federal Tails and State Puppy Dogs: Preempting
Parallel State Wage Claims to Preserve the Integrity of Federal Group Wage Actions, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 515, 521–30 (2009) (describing split among district courts over inherent
incompatibility between federal and state procedures); Daniel C. Lopez, Collective
Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61
(821)
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In recent years, an argument that these procedures are “inherently incom-
patible” gained steam in the Third Circuit.7  Attorneys defending employ-
ers have welcomed this doctrine, as group wage-and-hour litigation has
become more prevalent in federal practice.8
For several years, district courts have employed a disorganized variety
of rationales for extending or rejecting supplemental jurisdiction over
concurrent state law wage-and-hour claims.9  The general argument for
allowing dual-certification under both the FLSA and Rule 23 is that the
FLSA does not expressly prohibit these hybrid actions.10  Adopting this
line of reasoning, several circuit courts have rejected the inherent incom-
patibility doctrine.11  In spite of the doctrine’s treatment at the appellate
HASTINGS L.J. 275, 278 (2009) (surveying district courts’ struggle over inherent
incompatibility issue); Todd Schneider & William H. Willson IV, Concurrent Wage-
and-Hour Class and Collective Actions in Federal Court: Courts Around the Country Agree
to Disagree, ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (Thomson Reuters West), July 17,
2008, at *1, available at 2008 WL 2761267 (“[F]ederal courts have struggled with
the question of whether the different procedures for state and federal wage-and-
hour class actions should prevent a plaintiff from bringing both sets of claims in
the same action.”).
7. See De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“[M]andating an opt-in class or an opt-out class is a crucial policy decision . . . .”);
see also David J. Comeaux & Flyn L. Flesher, “Hybrid” Wage and Hour Class Actions
Approved by Third Circuit, OGLETREE DEAKINS (July 31, 2012), http://www.ogletree
deakins.com/publications/2012-07-31/”hybrid”-wage-and-hour-class-actions-ap-
proved-third-circuit (stating that Third Circuit was most favorable jurisdiction for
inherent incompatibility doctrine).
8. See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 870, 887 (N.D. Iowa
2008) (noting popularity of hybrid wage-and-hour claims among district courts);
see also Schneider & Willson, supra note 6, at *1 (“Wage-and-hour class-action litiga-
tion is an increasingly prevalent part of federal court dockets throughout the
United States.”). See generally Nicholas P. Cholis, After Ervin: How Combined Actions
Will Affect Wage and Hour Class Litigation in Illinois, 100 ILL. B.J. 430 (2012) (chroni-
cling upward trend in number of wage-and-hour suits in federal courts).
9. See Lopez, supra note 6, at 278 (explaining lack of unified rationale in
courts’ rejection or acceptance of inherent incompatibility).
10. See Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 974 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Noth-
ing in the text of the FLSA or the procedures established by the statute suggests
either that the FLSA was intended generally to oust other ordinary procedures
used in federal court or that class actions in particular could not be combined with
an FLSA proceeding.”); see also Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416,
420–24 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that FLSA does not prohibit federal jurisdiction
over corresponding state wage-and-hour law claims).
11. See Ervin, 632 F.3d at 980 (“[T]he ‘conflict’ between the opt-in procedure
under the FLSA and the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 is not a proper reason
to decline jurisdiction . . . .”); Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659
F.3d 234, 247 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that inherent incompatibility
between opt-in and opt-out procedures constitutes “compelling reason” for declin-
ing supplemental federal jurisdiction over state law class action); Wang v. Chinese
Daily News, Inc., 623 F.3d 743, 761 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that supplemental
jurisdiction over state law class action was within discretion of district court) vacated
on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 74 (2011); Lindsay, 448 F.3d at 424 (“While there is
unquestionably a difference—indeed, an opposite requirement—between opt-in
and opt-out procedures, we doubt that a mere procedural difference can curtail
2
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level, many district courts continued to have misgivings about combining
state law class actions with the FLSA’s collective actions.12
This article discusses the diminishing viability of the inherent incom-
patibility doctrine in the context of combined, or hybrid, wage-and-hour
group litigation.13  Part II summarizes the legal background of federal and
state wage-and-hour regulations, including an explanation of the proce-
dures applicable in actions brought under federal and state law.14  Part II
also discusses the jurisdictional principles that govern federal courts adju-
dicating dual-filed wage-and-hour actions.15  Finally, Part II outlines the
development and treatment by courts of the inherent incompatibility doc-
trine.16  Part III examines the Third Circuit’s opinion in Knepper v. Rite Aid
Corp.,17 and analyzes the court’s reasoning.18  Part IV offers suggestions to
practitioners in the Third Circuit on how best to take advantage of or miti-
gate Knepper’s outcome.19  Part V provides a brief conclusion.20
section 1367’s jurisdictional sweep.”). But see De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 312 (conclud-
ing that district court exceeded discretion in granting supplemental jurisdiction
over state law class action).
12. See, e.g., Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011)
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.
2012) (listing courts that have held Section 216(b) and Rule 23 class actions as
inherently incompatible); Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (“To allow [a] Section 216(b) opt-in action to proceed accompa-
nied by a Rule 23 opt-out state law class action claim would essentially nullify Con-
gress’s intent in crafting Section 216(b) and eviscerate the purpose of Section
216(b)’s opt-in requirement.”); see also De La Fuente v. FPM Ipsen Heat Treating,
Inc., No. 02 C 50188, 2002 WL 31819226 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2002) (rejecting Rule
23 certification of state law class because of risk of confusion to plaintiffs upon
receiving class action notice requiring them to opt in and opt out for same action).
13. For a discussion of the inherent incompatibility doctrine, see infra notes
36–38 and accompanying text.  Throughout this article I will use the term “hybrid”
to refer to the practice of bringing state law class actions and FLSA collective ac-
tions that are founded on the same basic employer action in federal court
simultaneously.
14. For a further discussion of the procedures governing group wage-and-
hour litigation under the FLSA, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and state law regulations, see infra notes 22–35 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the scope of original and supplemental federal
jurisdiction over hybrid wage-and-hour claims, see infra notes 36–49 and accompa-
nying text.
16. For a further discussion of the inherent incompatibility doctrine’s devel-
opment in district and circuit courts, see infra notes 50–78 and accompanying text.
17. 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2012).
18. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s holding and reasoning in
Knepper, see infra notes 76–122 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of Knepper’s impact on Third Circuit practition-
ers, see infra notes 123–32 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the demise of inherent incompatibility doc-
trine, see infra 130–34 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL AND STATE WAGE-AND-HOUR LAW
In 1938, Congress passed the FLSA, following a change in the Su-
preme Court’s posture toward federal wage-and-hour regulation.21  The
FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements established a regula-
tory floor for labor conditions to achieve a minimum living standard.22
The statute’s savings clause empowered states to set equivalent or more
stringent wage-and-hour regulations.23  Accordingly, most states enacted
wage-and-hour regimes, many of which create substantive rights that mir-
ror the FLSA.24
21. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006) (codifying fed-
eral minimum wage and overtime regulations); see also Lopez, supra note 6, at
279–80 (summarizing political history of federal and state wage-and-hour regula-
tion).  The Supreme Court initially resisted New Deal legislation that regulated
employee wages and hours, either on due process grounds or as violative of the
Commerce Clause. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618
(1936) (holding that state wage fixing legislation is “repugnant” to due process
right to freedom of contract); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (finding that fixing wages and hours of employees in intra-
state business exceeded constitutional federal power under Commerce Clause).
President Roosevelt and other wage law proponents responded by pushing for a
constitutional amendment to address low wages and poor working conditions, and
by introducing legislation to stack the Supreme Court with pro-New Deal judges.
See Lopez, supra note 6, at 279–80 (summarizing Democratic Party alliance with
labor unions to overcome opposition to labor regulation).  In what became the
“switch in time that saved nine,” the Court ultimately acquiesced to wage regula-
tion. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393–94 (1937) (upholding
Washington’s state minimum wage). See generally BURT SOLOMON, FDR v. THE CON-
STITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY (1st ed.
2009) (discussing Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s court-packing plan and Justice
Owen Roberts’s sudden and timely jurisprudential “switch”).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (addressing labor conditions “detrimental to the main-
tenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers”); id. § 206 (mandating federal minimum wage); id.
§ 207 (mandating time-and-a-half pay for hours worked in excess forty-hour work
week); see also Lopez, supra note 6, at 280–81 (describing regulatory floor-setting
policy behind FLSA). See generally John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464 (1939) (discussing FLSA’s devel-
opment and policy objectives).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 218 (“No provision of this chapter or of any order thereun-
der shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordi-
nance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established
under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek
established under this chapter . . . .”); see also Overnite Transp. Co. v. Tianti, 926
F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that “every Circuit that has considered the
issue” has concluded that FLSA does not preempt state wage law). But see Alexan-
der, supra note 6, at 549–58 (arguing that hybrid state claims should be dismissed
on theory that Rule 23 procedure erects “obstacle” in front of purposes and objec-
tives of Congress as expressed in FLSA).
24. See Schneider & Willson, supra note 6, at *1 (identifying forty-eight states,
as well as Puerto Rico and District of Columbia, as jurisdictions with wage-and-hour
regimes).  Although most state wage-and-hour regimes mirror the FLSA, some
states have gone beyond the FLSA by setting a higher minimum wage or imposing
harsher penalties for employer violations. See Allen, supra note 2, at *2 (noting
treble damages imposed by some state regimes).
4
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A. To Opt In or to Opt Out?  That is the Question
The FLSA created a private cause of action for employees to recover
unpaid wages due under the statute.25  Originally, such actions could be
pursued (1) individually, (2) collectively by an employee “on behalf of
other employees similarly situated,” or (3) by a non-party representative
designated by a group of similarly situated employees.26  In 1947, Con-
gress eliminated representative action by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act.27
In passing the law, Congress addressed a perceived increase in wage litiga-
tion initiated by union leaders with no direct stake in the claims, which
some believed created impermissible impediments to economic activity.28
Under the amended FLSA Section 216(b), only aggrieved employees can
represent a class, and any employee wishing to join a FLSA action must
affirmatively opt in.29
The FLSA’s opt-in requirement stands in sharp contrast to the opt-out
mechanism applicable to most class actions under Rule 23.30  Under Rule
25. See Lopez, supra note 6, at 281 (describing procedural provisions of FLSA
as originally passed).
26. See James M. Fraser, Note, Opt-In Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and
ADEA: What Does It Mean to Be “Similarly Situated”?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 95, 99
(2004) (outlining private action procedures available in original FLSA).
27. See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); see also Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v.
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989) (“The relevant amendment was for the purpose
of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees who asserted claims in their own
right and freeing employers of the burden of representative actions.”).  The Act
also narrowed employer liability for “portal pay,” or pay allegedly due employees
for time spent traveling on site to and from their workstations. See Fraser, supra
note 26, at 101 (discussing wave of anti-FLSA political activity leading to eventual
passage of Portal-to-Portal Act).
28. See Fraser, supra note 26, at 101 (explaining historical context of FLSA
reforms); see also Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 54 (1991) (describing intense political de-
bate over scope of FLSA as “one of the greatest legal-economic controversies in
American history . . . .”).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (creating opt-in requirement for FLSA col-
lective actions).  The term “opt-in” is not used in the statute:
An action to recover [under Sections 206 and 207] may be maintained
against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf
of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. No em-
ployee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in
which such action is brought.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. Compare id. (requiring potential litigants to file consent with court to join
FLSA claims), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (binding all class members who have
not filed affirmative request for exclusion from judgment).  The FLSA’s opt-in pro-
cedure for collective actions also applies to federal age and gender pay discrimina-
tion collective actions. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat.
56, 56–57 (1963) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) (prohibiting wage
discrimination based on gender and incorporating FLSA opt-in procedure into
private cause of action); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-202, § 7, 81 Stat. 604, 604–05 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b))
5
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23, members of a court-certified class are bound as parties to the action
unless they actively opt out by filing for exclusion.31  One of Rule 23’s
requirements for classification is that “a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”32
Importantly, very few state wage law regimes foreclose opt-out class
actions under Rule 23, assuming federal jurisdiction exists.33  On the
other hand, courts have consistently ruled that the clear conflict between
these two procedures forecloses use of a Rule 23 opt-out class action to
enforce rights created under the FLSA.34  The question remains as to
whether federal courts may enforce state law wage-and-hour class actions
under Rule 23 while concurrently enforcing FLSA collective actions under
the Section 216(b) scheme.35
B. Hybrid State and Federal Actions: A Question of Jurisdiction
Importantly, the difference between the opt-in procedure under Sec-
tion 216(b) and the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 leads to a significant
discrepancy in the number of plaintiffs in a FLSA collective action versus a
(prohibiting wage discrimination based on age and incorporating FLSA opt-in pro-
cedures); see also Lopez, supra note 6, at 275 (characterizing FLSA’s opt-in proce-
dure as “antiquated vestige” from “infancy of group litigation”).
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) (binding any certified class members “who
have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be class members”).
Interestingly, prior to a 1966 revision, Rule 23 employed an opt-in procedure es-
sentially equivalent to the FLSA Section 216(b) procedure. See Andrew C. Brun-
sden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law Enforcement in the Federal
Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 279–81 (2008) (discussing developmen-
tal interplay between Rule 23 and FLSA Section 216(b) group litigation
procedures).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (considering “likely difficulties in managing a
class action”).
33. See Schneider & Willson, supra note 6, at *1 (surveying state wage-and-
hour regulations and noting that only four jurisdictions require opt-in procedures
akin to FLSA’s collective action opt-in procedure).  Accordingly, most state law
wage-and-hour claims are pursued as class actions. See id. (explaining that employ-
ees that fit definition in state wage law class action complaint are considered mem-
bers of class unless they opt out).  Because the FLSA only applies to companies
making over half a million dollars or engaging in interstate commerce, some
states’ wage-and-hour regulations expressly extend only to intrastate employers not
covered under FLSA. See id. (exploring unique state law wage-and-hour schemes);
see also 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (describing scope of federal wage-and-hour
regulations).
34. See, e.g., Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“Courts have concluded that the plain language of this provision bars opt-out
class actions . . . under the well-established principle that, where Congress has
provided a detailed remedy, other remedies are unavailable.”); LaChapelle v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting “fundamental, irrec-
oncilable difference” between opt-out procedure in Rule 23 class actions and opt-
in procedure in FLSA Section 216(b) collective actions).
35. See De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2003)
(holding that in certain cases opt-out procedure may be inherently incompatible
with opt-in procedure).
6
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state law class action.36  Courts have sometimes agreed with litigants that
proceeding in the face of this discrepancy presents an inherent jurisdic-
tional problem.37  Whether or not to allow both claims to proceed in fed-
eral court is ultimately a question of when and how far federal courts’
jurisdiction over state law claims can and should extend.38  There are two
potential sources of federal jurisdiction over state wage-and-hour claims:
supplemental jurisdiction under Title 28, Section 1367 of the United
Stated Code and original jurisdiction stemming from the Class Action Fair-
ness Act (CAFA).39
1. Supplemental Jurisdiction Under Section 1367
Federal courts have original federal question jurisdiction over FLSA
actions regardless of their collective or individual status.40  In addition,
courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that
“form part of the same case or controversy” as the federal claim to which
the court’s original jurisdiction extends.41  Because most state wage-and-
hour regulations are substantively similar or identical to the FLSA, state
36. See id. (holding that inordinate size of state law class contributes to sub-
stantial predomination over federal law claim); see also Brunsden, supra note 31, at
291–94 (estimating that only about fifteen percent of potential FLSA plaintiffs opt
in to collective federal actions, while about one percent of certified class members
in state law class actions governed by Rule 23 opt out of such actions); Les A.
Schneider & J. Larry Stine, Hybrid Action, Collective Actions, and Class Actions, WAGE
& HOUR L.: COMPLIANCE & PRACTICE (Thomson Reuters West), 2013 (discussing
disparity between number of opt-in plaintiffs and opt-out plaintiffs typical of hy-
brid actions).
37. See Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (M.D. Pa. 2011)
(explaining that inherent incompatibility doctrine extends even to cases filed
under CAFA) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2012). But see Ervin v.
OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hile there may in
some cases be exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons for declining juris-
diction, the ‘conflict’ between the opt-in procedure under the FLSA and the opt-
out procedure under Rule 23 is not a proper reason to decline jurisdiction under
section 1367(c)(4).”).
38. For a discussion of the Knepper court’s rejection of non-jurisdictional argu-
ments, see infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the
Knepper court’s rejection of the Rules Enabling Act challenge, see infra notes
113–14 and accompanying text.
39. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Brunsden, supra
note 31, at 284 (“Jurisdictional issues in hybrid class actions will continue to be
addressed under both CAFA and supplemental jurisdiction.”).
40. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2006) (granting federal courts federal question jurisdiction authorized by
Article III); see also Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807
(1986) (noting that federal courts have “federal question” jurisdiction at least over
causes of action created by federal statute).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (outlining rules for supplemental federal jurisdic-
tion over state law claims).  For claims to form part of the same case or controversy,
they must “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” See United Mine
7
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claims usually rest on the same nucleus of facts as corresponding FLSA
claims.42
But federal courts retain discretion to decline supplemental jurisdic-
tion where, for example, a claim raises “novel or complex” state law issues,
or where the state law claim “substantially predominates over” the federal
claim that supported original jurisdiction.43  Federal courts may also de-
cline supplemental jurisdiction if, “in exceptional circumstances, there are
other compelling reasons . . . .”44  Where jurisdiction over state law claims
is merely supplemental, some federal courts have claimed discretion to
dismiss the state class actions.45
2. Original Jurisdiction Under CAFA
Under the CAFA, federal jurisdiction is not merely supplemental.46
Instead, the CAFA relaxes the rules for federal diversity jurisdiction for
large class action suits.47  Thus, the statute also grants original federal ju-
risdiction over many state law wage-and-our class action suits.48  Impor-
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (finding discretionary supple-
mental jurisdiction of federal courts over some state law claims).
42. For a discussion of similarities between rights created under state and fed-
eral wage-and-hour laws, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (2) (expressly granting federal courts discretion
to decline supplemental jurisdiction under limited conditions); see also De Asencio
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2003) (dismissing state wage-and-
hour class action because it would substantially predominate over FLSA claim);
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (“[The] justification [for supplemental jurisdiction] lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these
are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims . . . .”).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).
45. For a discussion of De Asencio and the extent of courts’ discretion to reject
supplemental jurisdiction, see infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
46. For a discussion of federal jurisdiction in large class action suits under the
CAFA, see infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
47. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (amending diversity re-
quirements for class actions).  For example, the CAFA significantly expanded fed-
eral jurisdiction over class actions, primarily by replacing the “complete diversity”
requirement with a “minimal diversity” requirement, which only entails diversity
between any plaintiff and any defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (setting mini-
mal diversity requirement for diversity jurisdiction over class actions).  The CAFA
also replaced the usual non-aggregated $75,000 minimum amount in controversy
requirement with a $5,000,000 requirement that may be aggregated. See id.
§ 1332(d)(6) (allowing aggregation for purposes of calculating amount in
controversy).
48. See Jason R. Bristol, Thomas A. Downie & Ashley A. Weaver, Intended and
Unintended Consequences: The 2006 Fair Minimum Wage Amendment of the Ohio Consti-
tution, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 367, 375 (2010) (discussing impact of CAFA on jurisdic-
tion over wage-and-hour actions).  To satisfy the CAFA’s relaxed diversity rules,
only one plaintiff must be from a different state than the employer being sued. See
Brunsden, supra note 31, at 283 (discussing CAFA’s expansion of federal jurisdic-
tion over interstate class actions).
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tantly, where diversity jurisdiction exists under the CAFA, federal courts
cannot dismiss state class actions based on the discretionary supplemental
jurisdiction theory outlined above.49
C. Courts Grapple with Hybrid Actions and Inherent Incompatibility
The Third Circuit became the first circuit court to grapple with the
supplemental jurisdiction question in De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc.50  In De
Asencio, hourly employees at a chicken processing plant gained collective
treatment in an FLSA suit, and only filed for class certification under Rule
23 after the fact under a unique Pennsylvania contract law theory.51  The
district court ultimately granted Rule 23 certification for the state law
claims and the defendant plant-owner disputed jurisdiction on interlocu-
tory appeal.52
The Third Circuit held that the state law claim substantially
predominated over the FLSA claim for two reasons.53  First, the presence
of complex and unique state law questions militated against supplemental
jurisdiction.54  Additionally, the court held that the “sheer difference in
numbers” between the Rule 23 opt-out class and the FLSA opt-in class
might constitute substantial predomination.55  Moreover, although
framed as a jurisdictional issue, the court clearly placed a heavy emphasis
on the policy behind Congress’s decision to require an opt-in procedure
for FLSA claims.56
49. For a discussion of supplemental jurisdiction and discretion to decline
jurisdiction under Section 1367, see supra notes 40–45.
50. 342 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2003).  The Third Circuit held that the district court
exceeded its discretion under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(1) by extending supplemental
jurisdiction to the Pennsylvania wage law class action. See id. at 307–12 (conclud-
ing that district court exceeded its discretion).
51. See id. at 305 (describing employees’ uncompensated time spent donning
and doffing protective clothing to prevent disease associated with handling of
chicken slaughtering refuse).  At the time De Asencio was being decided, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania had not yet ruled on the state law theory. See id. at
309 (discussing unique implied oral contract theory for establishing employment
under Pennsylvania law).
52. See id. at 305 (discussing procedural posture of case).
53. See id. at 308–09 (discussing statutory limits of federal supplemental juris-
diction under Section 1367 and scope of federal court discretion in determining
substantial predomination).
54. See id. at 309 (“[A] district court will find substantial predomination
‘where a state claim constitutes the real body of the case, to which the federal
claim is only an appendage’ . . . .” (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966))).
55. See id. at 311 (“Predomination under section 1367 generally goes to the
type of claim, not the number of parties involved.  But the disparity in numbers of
similarly situated plaintiffs may be so great that it becomes dispositive by transform-
ing the action to a substantial degree, by causing the federal tail represented by a
comparatively small number of plaintiffs to wag what is in substance a state dog.”)
(emphasis added).
56. See id. (“[I]t is sufficient to note that mandating an opt-in class or an opt-
out class is a crucial policy decision.  Congress has selected an opt-in class for FLSA
9
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D. Other Circuit Courts Respond to Inherent Incompatibility
In Lindsay v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,57 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court rejected a jurisdictional argument similar to the one
posed in De Asencio.58  Importantly, Lindsay did not involve either the com-
plex state law issues or the large disparity in Rule 23 and FLSA class sizes
present in De Asencio.59  Nonetheless, Lindsay stands for the proposition
that any conflict inherent in the two procedures is overcome by Congress’s
clear policy interest in expansive supplemental jurisdiction.60
In the more recent case of Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc.,61 the
Seventh Circuit took on De Asencio directly, distinguishing it on the basis of
the unique state law issues presented there.62  The Ervin court also called
into question De Asencio’s suggestion that disparity in numbers alone might
constitute substantial predomination.63  The court reasoned that Section
actions.”).  Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear what the controlling factor in the
case was. Compare id. (stating that diversity in class sizes may be dispositive), with id.
(stating that disparity in class sizes may not be dispositive), and id. (stating that
dual-classification may be “proper” where federal and state actions raise similar
issues and proof requirements).
57. 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
58. See id. at 424 (limiting court discretion to dismiss state law claims on sub-
stantial predomination theory).
59. See id. at 424–25 (holding that differences between opt-in and opt-out pro-
cedures did not constitute “exceptional circumstances” justifying discretionary re-
jection of supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367(c)).  The court did not
directly distinguish De Asencio, which came down the same year, but the state law
issues in Lindsay were nearly identical to the FLSA issues and the FLSA claim
achieved an unusually high opt-in rate. See id. at 425 n.12 (rejecting substantial
predomination argument).
60. See id. at 424 (“While there is unquestionably a difference—indeed, an
opposite requirement—between opt-in and opt-out procedures, we doubt that a
mere procedural difference can curtail section 1367’s jurisdictional sweep.  Regard-
less of any policy decision implicit in [FLSA]’s opt-in requirement . . . Congress
made its intent regarding the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction clear: ‘Con-
gress conferred a broad grant of jurisdiction upon the district courts, indicating a
congressional desire that, supplemental jurisdiction at least in the first instance . . .
go to the constitutional limit . . . .’”) (citation omitted).
61. 632 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2011).
62. See id. at 980 (noting that plaintiffs’ Illinois Wage Payment and Collection
Act claims “essentially replicate” their FLSA claims).
63. See id. (“As long as the claims are similar between the state plaintiffs and
the federal action, it makes no real difference whether the numbers vary.”).  Al-
though the disparity in class sizes in Ervin was greater than Lindsay, it was not as
vast as the disparity in De Asencio: the disparity in Lindsay was a narrow 204 FLSA
claimants and 228 state law claimants. See id.  (comparing disparity of class sizes in
Lindsay, Ervin, and De Asencio).  In Ervin, the FLSA action garnered thirty opt-in
claimants and the Rule 23 action would have achieved between 180 and 250 claim-
ants. See id. (same).  In De Asencio, the disparity was far more severe with only 447
FLSA claimants compared to a Rule 23 class of 4,100 claimants. See id. at 981
(same).
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1367’s efficiency policy would not be served by requiring two separate tri-
als on the same facts simply because the class sizes were different.64
The Ervin court also rejected the district court’s inherent incompati-
bility holding.65  According to the district court, Rule 23’s opt-out proce-
dure undermined the congressional intent behind the FLSA’s opt-in
procedure, rendering Rule 23 actions categorically incompatible when
combined with FLSA actions in federal court.66  The Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged the procedural tension but held that the FLSA’s language
provides no textual justification for dismissing state law claims.67
E. Inherent Incompatibility Arguments in District Courts After Ervin
After Ervin, it was unclear whether inherent incompatibility would go
any further, at least on the Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction argu-
ment.68  But some courts continued to dismiss hybrid actions on jurisdic-
tional grounds, embracing the inherent incompatibility argument in
several different iterations.69  The most common argument—rejected in
the circuit court decisions discussed above—continues to be that massive
state law class actions will tend to “predominate” over corresponding fed-
eral claims for purposes of Section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction.70  Im-
portantly, the passage of the CAFA may render this line of cases moot.71
64. See id. at 981 (speculating that requiring separate litigation on same facts
would undermine efficiency policy in most cases).  The court did not entirely fore-
close the possibility that De Asencio’s reasoning might apply in exceptional cases.
See id. at 980 (declining to take position on “whether a state law class might ever so
dwarf a federal FLSA action that supplemental jurisdiction becomes too thin a
reed on which to ferry the state claims into federal court”).
65. See id. at 974 (“[T]here is no insurmountable tension between the FLSA
and Rule 23(b)(3).”).
66. See Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., No. 08 C 1091, 2009 WL 1904544, at *2
(N.D. Ill. July 1, 2009) (“[T]here is a clear incompatibility between the ‘opt out’
nature of a Rule 23 action and the ‘opt in’ nature of a Section 216 action.”).
67. See Ervin, 632 F.3d at 977 (“[T]he court jumped too quickly to congres-
sional intent.  Before taking that step, we must examine the text of the FLSA
itself.”).
68. See Cholis, supra note 8, at 432–33 (discussing impact of Ervin on Illinois
district courts’ handling of hybrid wage-and-hour actions).
69. See Schneider & Willson, supra note 6, at *2 (“No definitive line of cases
has emerged, and the sheer volume of cases addressing this subject makes it impos-
sible to put them into a finite number of categories.”).
70. For a discussion of supplemental jurisdiction under Section 1367, see
supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text; see also McClain v. Leona’s Pizzeria, Inc.,
222 F.R.D. 574, 577 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that Section 1367’s grant of supple-
mental jurisdiction “does not contemplate a plaintiff using supplemental jurisdic-
tion as a rake to drag as many members as possible into what would otherwise be a
federal collective action.”).
71. For a discussion of the CAFA’s jurisdictional sweep and underlying policy
objectives, see supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion
of the CAFA’s impact on hybrid wage claims, see supra notes 46–49 and accompa-
nying text.
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Another argument against hybrid actions is that the plaintiff notifica-
tion process would be too confusing to potential participants and would
create manageability issues when Rule 23 and FLSA notifications are si-
multaneously employed.72  However, courts rejecting inherent incompati-
bility have made precisely the opposite argument: forcing litigation of
identical factual and nearly identical legal issues in two separate forums
creates needless inefficiency.73
A few courts have embraced the inherent incompatibility doctrine in
its purest form, arguing that Rule 23’s opt-out default simply strays too far
from Congress’s clear intent in creating the FLSA’s opt-in procedure for
wage-and-hour actions.74  One district court in Pennsylvania has accepted
the inherent incompatibility theory—including in cases on appeal in Knep-
per below—so it seemed possible that the Third Circuit might be ripe
ground for a circuit split.75
III. KNEPPER V. RITE AID CORP.
In Knepper the Third Circuit became the fifth court of appeals to re-
ject the inherent incompatibility argument against hybrid claims.76  Spe-
cifically, the Middle District of Pennsylvania embraced inherent
incompatibility where independent federal jurisdiction existed over the
state law claims under the CAFA, and where the state law claims were filed
separately from the FLSA claims.77  But the Third Circuit’s rejection of the
doctrine in this context likely applies more broadly, as it addressed the
heart of the legislative intent argument that forms the basis for inherent
incompatibility.78
72. See Lopez, supra note 6, at 286 (discussing Rule 23 notification
requirements).
73. See Fraser, supra note 26, at 102–05 (discussing efficiency considerations
behind modern Rule 23).
74. For a discussion of courts that have declined jurisdiction over state law
class actions solely because of a conflict between Rule 23 and FLSA, see supra note
12 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011)
(rejecting jurisdiction over state law claims based on conflict between Rule 23 and
FLSA Section 216(b)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp.,
675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2012); Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (concluding that application of Rule 23 and FLSA Section 216(b)
concurrently would “nullify” Congress’s intent).
76. For a discussion of appellate court treatment of the inherent incompati-
bility doctrine, see supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text.
77. For a list of courts that have declined jurisdiction over state law class ac-
tions solely because of a conflict between Rule 23 and FLSA, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
78. For a summary of the Third Circuit’s policy analysis in Knepper, see infra
notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
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A. Factual and Procedural Background
James Fisher and Robert Vasvari, both former assistant Rite Aid store
managers, were opt-in plaintiffs in a nationwide FLSA collective action
against Rite Aid for unpaid overtime wages.79  Plaintiffs claimed that Rite
Aid misclassified assistant store managers as exempt from the FLSA’s over-
time requirements under Section 207.80  Shortly after joining the FLSA
claim, Fisher and Vasvari independently initiated Rule 23 class action
claims against Rite Aid based on state law theories very similar to the FLSA
claim, and sought compensation for unpaid overtime under Maryland and
Ohio law respectively.81  Both claims made their way to the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, where the FLSA collective claim was being litigated.82
The district court agreed with Rite Aid that Rule 23’s opt-in proce-
dure is inherently incompatible with the FLSA’s opt-out scheme because it
79. See Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2012) (reciting
procedural background); see also Craig v. Rite Aid Corp., Civil Action No. 4:08-CV-
2317, 2011 WL 3652175, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2011), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 08-CV-2317, 2011 WL 3651360 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2011) (recognizing
as similarly situated for purposes of collective action under FLSA “[a]ll individuals
classified as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay provisions and employed as
salaried Assistant Store Managers during any workweek within the previous three
years in any of the 4,901 [Rite Aid] stores . . . .”).
80. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 252 (explaining overtime claim under FLSA Sec-
tion 207).  Section 207’s overtime requirement requires time-and-a-half pay for
hours worked beyond forty weekly hours:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ
any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a
workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives com-
pensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a
rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006) (requiring time-and-a-half for hours worked in excess
of forty hours per week).
81. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 252–53 (tracing procedural origins of hybrid
claim); see also Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 700 (M.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.
2012); Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2012).
82. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 252 (explaining transfer and re-filing procedures).
Citing judicial efficiency principles, the District of Maryland dismissed Fisher’s
class action claim without prejudice and Fisher re-filed with the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. See Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., Civil Action No. RDB-09-1909, 2010 WL
2332101, at *2 (D. Md. June 8, 2010) (explaining first-to-file rule and granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss).  Fisher successfully re-filed in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 252 (ex-
plaining Fisher’s re-filing in Middle District of Pennsylvania).  The Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio transferred Vasvari’s claim to the Middle District of Pennsylvania
because of a transfer clause in his employment contract with Rite Aid. See id. at 253
(providing reason for transferring Vasvari’s claim).  The Middle District of Penn-
sylvania then substituted Daniel Knepper as the plaintiff in Vasvari’s claim after
Vasvari died. See id. at 252 (explaining that claim did not otherwise change in any
respect).
13
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undermines Congress’s intent to limit the volume of wage-and-hour litiga-
tion, as well as preventing plaintiffs’ rights from being litigated without
their knowledge.83  Interestingly, although inherent incompatibility has
generally been invoked only in hybrid actions, the district court held that
the doctrine bars federal courts from processing parallel state law wage-
and-hour claims under any circumstance.84  Specifically, the court held
that separately filed FLSA and state law wage-and-hour actions conflict
with the policy underlying both Section 216(b)’s opt-in requirement, as
well as that underlying hybrid actions.85  On the other hand, noting that
Congress only intended the FLSA to set a regulatory floor, the district
court succinctly rejected Rite Aid’s argument that federal labor standards
preempted any similar rights created by state law.86  Thus, the district
court’s dismissal would not prevent plaintiffs from re-filing their state law
claims in state court.87
B. Third Circuit Rejects Inherent Incompatibility
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit began its analysis by pro-
viding a detailed history of the opt-in procedure and its incorporation into
the FLSA through the Portal-to-Portal Act.88  In particular, the court high-
lighted Congress’s concern that early FLSA litigation had created im-
mense, unpredictable, and retroactive employer liability.89  According to
the court, in this regard Congress was primarily targeting so-called “repre-
83. See id. at 253 (summarizing district court holding).  The Middle District of
Pennsylvania pointed to its own previous findings on the inherent incompatibility
argument, as well as precedent from other district courts accepting inherent in-
compatibility. See, e.g., Fisher, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (providing cases supporting
inherent incompatibility doctrine);  Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d
522, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (“To allow an [sic] Section 216(b) opt-in action to pro-
ceed accompanied by a Rule 23 opt-out state law class action claim would essen-
tially nullify Congress’s intent in crafting Section 216(b) and eviscerate the
purpose of Section 216(b)’s opt-in requirement.”).
84. See Fisher, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 706 (extending inherent incompatibility doc-
trine to separately filed FSLA and state wage-and-hour claims).
85. See id. (“[D]enying a plaintiff the opportunity to litigate a claim in one
action, but allowing the claim to proceed in an action that only differs from the
original by docket number, does not vindicate the purposes behind application of
the doctrine in the first place.”).
86. See Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (M.D. Pa. 2011),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that presence of
“savings clause” in FLSA constitutes clear evidence that “states are free to enact
relevant laws that are more protective than the scope of the FLSA.”).
87. See Fisher, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (dismissing state law claim without
prejudice and holding that plaintiff had no basis for relief in federal court on state
law claim).
88. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 253 (acknowledging dispute over purpose of 1947
amendment “and its implications for federal opt-out class actions based on state
law”).
89. See id. at 255 (discussing congressional intent behind Portal-to-Portal Act’s
amendments to Section 216(b) of FLSA).
14
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sentative” actions, allegedly initiated by non-employee union leaders as a
bargaining strategy.90
A secondary legislative concern, according to the court, was the pros-
pect of one-way intervention, whereby large numbers of passive employees
might choose to sit out of FLSA litigation initially, opting to be bound by
the judgment once it became clear that the outcome would be in their
favor.91  The court also noted that the conflict between opt-in and opt-out
procedures only became relevant when Rule 23 was revised to its current
opt-out form.92
The Third Circuit next acknowledged the agreement among courts
that the opt-in requirement in Section 216(b) clearly precludes use of a
Rule 23 opt-out class action to enforce FLSA violations themselves.93  As
the court explained, the inherent incompatibility argument essentially ex-
tends this logic to state law wage-and-hour claims filed in federal court.94
But, following the Seventh Circuit’s lead in Ervin, the Third Circuit found
no evidence that the text of Section 216(b) or Congress’s intent indicated
any unacceptable conflict between the two procedures.95
Undergoing a textual analysis of Section 216(b), the Third Circuit
determined that, on its face, the statute only requires application of the
opt-in mechanism to actions initiated under Sections 206, 207, or
215(a)(3) of the FLSA, which (respectively) cover minimum wage, over-
time pay, and employer retaliation against employees who file FLSA ac-
tions.96  Specifically, the court flatly disagreed with the district court’s
90. See id. at 256 (distilling Portal-to-Portal Act’s legislative history); see also
Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446–47 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (pro-
viding detailed account of Portal-to-Portal Act’s legislative history).
91. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 255–57 (identifying legislative purpose for filed
consent requirement in 1947 amendment).  The court also noted Congress’s con-
cern that Section 216(b) claims might be used by derelict plaintiffs to circumvent
the statute of limitations. See id. (clarifying Congress’s intent that collective FLSA
actions not prevent running of statute of limitations for plaintiffs who only join
action after statute of limitation has run).
92. See id. at 257 (discussing effect of Rule 23’s 1966 revision on FLSA claims).
93. See id. (“[W]here Congress has provided a detailed remedy, other reme-
dies are unavailable.”).  The same logic applies to other federal causes of action
that incorporate FLSA’s opt-in mechanism. See, e.g., LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act’s express adoption of FLSA opt-in mechanism to be irreconcilable with
invocation of Rule 23 for purpose of circumventing Section 216(b)’s consent
requirement).
94. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 258 (examining reasoning, context, and develop-
ment of inherent incompatibility doctrine).  In Knepper the district court extended
the same logic even as far as state law wage-and-hour class action claims filed in
federal court independent of a related FLSA collective action. See id. (explaining
district court’s application of inherent incompatibility doctrine).
95. See id. at 258–59 (identifying Ervin as “[t]he most thorough examination”
of inherent incompatibility argument).
96. See id. (examining text of Section 216(b)).  Indeed, Section 216(b) states,
“[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his con-
sent in writing . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (emphasis added).  It is clear from
15
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finding that the scope of Section 216(b) was ambiguous on the issue of
whether it applied to causes of action originating in state law.97  Further-
more, the court noted that Section 216(b) makes no mention of state law
causes of action, and the FLSA includes an express savings clause preserv-
ing state regulatory regimes from federal preemption.98
The Third Circuit also disapproved of the trial court’s emphasis on
perceived congressional intent without any “clear textual or doctrinal ba-
sis.”99  More importantly, the Third Circuit disagreed with the trial court
that Congress’s primary intent in passing the Portal-to-Portal Act amend-
ments to Section 216(b) was to ensure that “absent individuals would not
have their rights litigated without their input or knowledge.”100  Instead,
in the court’s view, Congress’s primary purpose was to prevent union rep-
resentatives from “manufactur[ing] litigation in which they had no per-
sonal stake,” and to prevent “one-way intervention by plaintiffs who would
not be bound by an adverse judgment.”101
the context that “any such action” refers narrowly to “[a]n action to recover the
liability prescribed in either of the preceding sentences,” which only includes em-
ployer violations of “the provisions of section 206 or section 207 . . . .  [Or] the
provisions of section 215(a)(3) . . . .” Id.
97. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 259 (finding that explicit limitation to actions
under FLSA and absence of mention of state law causes of action does not consti-
tute ambiguity).  In a footnote, the court also highlighted a clear statement in the
Portal-to-Portal Act’s legislative history indicating that the opt-in requirement
“shall be applicable only with respect to actions commenced under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.” Id. at 260 n.14 (quotation and citation omitted).
98. See id. at 258–59 (summarizing Seventh Circuit’s inquiry into statutory
ambiguity).
99. See id. at 259–60 (citing principle that extrinsic materials only appropriate
in statutory interpretation where text is otherwise ambiguous).  The Third Circuit
echoed the Seventh Circuit in this regard. See Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 632
F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he court jumped too quickly to congressional
intent.  Before taking that step, we must examine the text of the FLSA itself.”).
100. Knepper, 675 F.3d at 259 (quoting Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp.
2d 700, 705 (M.D. Pa. 2011)).  The court acknowledged that there “was some con-
cern [among legislators] that plaintiffs could be bound by a decision” without
their knowledge or input. See id. at 260 (discussing Portal-to-Portal Act’s legislative
record); see also Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (M.D. Pa.
2006) (“It is clear that Congress labored to create an opt-in scheme when it cre-
ated Section 216(b) specifically to alleviate the fear that absent individuals would
not have their rights litigated without their input or knowledge.”).
101. Knepper, 675 F.3d at 260.  The court explained that historical evidence
establishes the primary legislative purposes behind the Portal-to-Portal Act. See id.
(discussing significance of legislative intent).  The court also noted two divergent
interpretations of “representative” action: whereas the Portal-to-Portal Act sought
to prevent non-employee third parties from litigating the rights of others without
their knowledge through “representative” actions, Rule 23 allows for “representa-
tive” actions only by interested members of the class whose rights are at issue. Com-
pare id. at 260 n.15 (speculating that modern Rule 23 representative actions are
more akin to concept of “collective” action endorsed in legislative history of Portal-
to-Portal Act), with Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 707, 714 (M.D. Pa.
2011) (equating opt-out actions with representative actions that Congress sought
to limit with Portal-to-Portal Act amendments).
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Furthermore, the court explained that the congressional intent be-
hind the CAFA must also be balanced.102  According to the court, the
CAFA articulates a countervailing legislative goal of extending federal ju-
risdiction to all state law class actions that meet the statute’s require-
ments.103  Thus, without a clear textual mandate, federal jurisdiction
otherwise contemplated by Congress under the CAFA should not be de-
clined merely because it purportedly curtails another legislative goal.104
The court also revisited its decision in De Asencio—which Rite Aid ar-
gued supported application of inherent incompatibility—distinguishing it
on two grounds.105  First, the issue in De Asencio was one of supplemental
jurisdiction, and the court declined jurisdiction because the complexity of
the state claims at issue and the size of the state law class.106  In contrast,
the state law claims at issue in Knepper are substantively and factually simi-
lar to the FLSA claim.107  More importantly, the court noted that, unlike
102. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 260–61 (rejecting assumption that legislative pur-
pose behind Portal-to-Portal Act is only consideration relevant to evaluating inher-
ent incompatibility inquiry).
103. See id. (arguing that courts should not invoke extratextual materials to
decline jurisdiction otherwise authorized by statute).
104. See id. at 261 (noting that plaintiffs’ satisfaction of CAFA jurisdictional
requirements was not disputed by defendant or district court); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a), (d) (2006) (establishing requirements for extending and declining fed-
eral jurisdiction over class actions).
105. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 261 (clarifying De Asencio’s holding and scope);
see also De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 313 (3d Cir. 2003) (reversing
district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law wage class ac-
tion).  For a discussion of De Asencio, see supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text;
see also Ervin v. OS Rest. Services, Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 2011) (distin-
guishing De Asencio as case involving complex state law issues); Wang v. Chinese
Daily News, Inc., 623 F.3d 743, 761 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing unique circum-
stances of De Asencio), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 74
(2011); Lindsay v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(characterizing De Asencio as involving more than mere procedural differences).
106. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 261 (distinguishing De Asencio on jurisdictional
and factual grounds); see also De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 308 (rejecting supplemental
jurisdiction based on substantial predomination).  The De Asencio court stated:
“Here, the inordinate size of the state-law class, the different terms of proof re-
quired by the implied contract state-law claim, and the general federal interest in
opt-in wage actions suggest the federal action is an appendage to the more com-
prehensive state action.” Id. at 312; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (authorizing fed-
eral courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction where state law claims substantially
predominate federal issues forming basis for original jurisdiction).  Under Section
1367(c), supplemental jurisdiction may be declined if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
Id.
107. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 261 (noting absence of complex or novel issues).
Interestingly, the court did not address the size discrepancy between the state law
17
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the supplemental jurisdiction in De Asencio, independent federal jurisdic-
tion over the state class actions in Knepper existed under the CAFA, which
provides no relevant basis for declining jurisdiction.108
The court next turned to Rite Aid’s preemption argument, which it
rejected succinctly.109  In the court’s view, a fatal flaw for the preemption
argument was the fact that the conflicting classification procedures at issue
were both provided by federal law.110  Thus, because no other conflict ex-
isted between state and federal law, the court affirmed the district court’s
judgment that the FLSA does not preempt the relevant state laws.111  Fi-
nally, the court also rejected Rite Aid’s argument that classification under
Rule 23 violates the Rules Enabling Act (REA) because it abridges the sub-
stantive rights of both employers and employees under the FLSA.112  The
REA argument assumes that FLSA Section 216(b) creates a substantive
right for employers—to not be sued through representative action—and
for plaintiffs—to not have their rights litigated without their knowledge or
input.113
and FLSA classes in Knepper. See id. (declining to discuss size discrepancy between
classes).
108. See id. (clarifying difference between supplemental and CAFA
jurisdiction).
109. See id. at 262–64 (characterizing preemption argument as recapitulation
of inherent incompatibility argument and affirming district court’s holding of no
preemption); see also Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (M.D. Pa.
2011) (holding that presence of savings clause indicates Congress intended FLSA
standards to serve as mere regulatory floor).
110. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 263 (ruling preemption “inapplicable” because
“federal law cannot preempt another federal law” and because Portal-to-Portal Act
of 1947 “cannot impliedly repeal” jurisdiction sweep of CAFA, which came long
after).
111. See id. at 264 (affirming district court’s judgment on preemption issue).
The court explained that preemption was untenable because the state wage-and-
hour laws at issue were not substantively in conflict with FLSA’s virtually identical
standards. See id. (rejecting “counterintuitive” argument that “enforcement of
[state law] standards that are identical with [FLSA standards]” would present any
obstacle to fulfillment of congressional purpose); see also Brief for the Sec’y of La-
bor as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellants at 9, Knepper v. Rite Aid,
Corp., 675 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11–1684, 11–1685), 2011 WL 2603762, at
*9 (rejecting preemption argument).
112. See Knepper, 675 F.3d at 264–65 (rejecting argument that Rule 23’s classi-
fication and preclusive effect abridges employers’ substantive rights under FLSA
not to be sued in representative actions, and plaintiffs’ rights not to have their
rights litigated without their knowledge or input). See generally Lopez, supra note 6
(examining REA argument against hybrid actions in light of plaintiffs’ substantive
rights and arguing that REA precludes hybrid actions as regulating more than
merely procedure).
113. See Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 441 (W.D. Pa.
2007) (holding that Rule 23 violates REA by abridging substantive rights of em-
ployers and employees under FLSA). But see Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250
F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting Ellis court’s characterization of rights
under FLSA).
18
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C. Analyzing Knepper
In Knepper, the Third Circuit became the fifth federal appeals court to
reject inherent incompatibility, finding insufficient legislative and histori-
cal evidence to support the argument that Congress intended to eliminate
opt-out classification for the FLSA.114  It also held that the FLSA’s pur-
poses do not indicate any disapproval of opt-out class actions and that
Rule 23 opt-outs were not yet extant at the time of passage.115  On its face,
the Third Circuit was correct that the FLSA includes no textual prohibi-
tion on using any federal procedures normally available to state law
claims.116  There is simply no indication from the statute that Congress
intended to prevent state claims from going forward through Rule 23 clas-
sification; in fact, the presence of a “saving clause” lends credence to the
argument because Congress clearly intended to support, rather than hin-
der, state wage-and-hour regulation.117  Particularly where defendants vol-
untarily remove state law class actions to federal court, it seems
fundamentally reasonable not to permit them to argue for dismissal on
grounds of incompatibility with federal procedures.118
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit too quickly overlooked the fact that
FLSA’s opt-in requirement was specifically designed to prevent easy classi-
fication based on a policy of trying to limit so-called representative suits.119
Hybrid claims employing a Rule 23 opt-out class clearly undermine this
policy choice.120  Nonetheless, the court was perhaps correct to leave reso-
lution of this policy tension to the legislature, rather than creating a new
jurisdictional doctrine out of whole cloth.121
IV. IMPACT OF KNEPPER
Knepper likely marks the end of the inherent incompatibility doctrine
because the Supreme Court is not likely to grant certiorari on this issue,
given such a strong degree of uniformity among the circuit courts.122  Ad-
114. For a discussion of circuit court treatment of the inherent incompatibil-
ity doctrine, see supra notes 56–67 and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s consideration of congressional
purpose, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the text and policy of the Portal-to-Portal amend-
ments, see supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s characterization of congressional
purpose, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
118. See Cholis, supra note 8, at 431 (discussing policy behind rejecting appli-
cation of inherent incompatibility doctrine to bad faith defendants).
119. For a discussion of the policy behind the Portal-to-Portal amendments,
see supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the district court’s policy analysis, see supra note 66
and accompanying text.
121. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (noting that
policy decisions are best left to legislatures not courts).
122. See Comeaux & Flesher, supra note 7 (discussing possibility of Supreme
Court grant of certoriari); see also supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (dis-
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ditionally, because the Third Circuit itself wrote the only circuit court
opinion that offered support to the doctrine in De Asencio, the court’s clear
circumscribing of De Asencio in Knepper erects a significant barrier in front
of the doctrine’s proponents.123  Thus, in both the Third Circuit and be-
yond, the Knepper holding offers encouragement to plaintiffs’ lawyers con-
sidering hybrid wage-and-hour claims, which can be very powerful
weapons for recovering unpaid wages.124
Given this legal reality, hybrid actions may become even more numer-
ous in the coming years than they already have been in the past.125  An
increase in hybrid actions is likely to lead to significantly larger awards for
plaintiff classes because of the combination of Rule 23’s larger class sizes
and the FLSA’s more lenient classification standard, as well as the fact that
employers will face penalties under state and federal law.126  For this rea-
son, plaintiffs’ lawyers in Pennsylvania and throughout the Third Circuit
should bring dual-filed state and federal class actions without worrying
that the state claims might be dismissed by employer-friendly district
courts.127  When investigating other employment issues, such as discrimi-
nation, plaintiffs’ lawyers should also inquire into wage-and-hour issues
like overtime work, unpaid breaks, and misclassification of workers.128
As for defense lawyers and corporate counsel, the threat of these suits
makes vigilant compliance with the FLSA and state wage regulations more
important than ever.129  This includes avoiding costly “misclassification”
mistakes when applying overtime exemptions and fostering a corporate
cussing uniform rejection of inherent incompatibility doctrine among appeals
courts).
123. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s handling of inherent incompati-
bility in De Asencio, see supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text.
124. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 903, 903 (2005) (“A class action is perhaps the most powerful tool that
plaintiffs can wield.”); see also Cholis, supra note 8, at 430 (calling hybrid wage-and-
hour claims powerful “double whammy” for plaintiffs).
125. See Cholis, supra note 8, at 430 (noting upward trend in number of wage-
and-hour suits in federal courts).
126. See id. at 433 (explaining that defendants face increased liability because
FLSA and state regulations each impose separate penalties); see also Lizak v. Great
Masonry, Inc., No. 08-C-1930, 2009 WL 3065396, at *9–10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2009)
(allowing for recovery of damages under both FLSA and Illinois wage-and-hour
laws); Two-Headed Monsters: DOL Says Workers Should Be Able to Sue Under State, Federal
Law at Same Time, EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO FAIR LAB. STANDARDS ACT NEWSL. (Thomp-
son Publ’g Grp., Inc.), Mar. 2010 (describing hybrid actions as “two-headed mon-
sters” that expose employers to increased liability).
127. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania district courts’ treatment of the in-
herent incompatibility doctrine, see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
128. See Allen, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing effective practices among employ-
ment plaintiff lawyers).
129. See id. at 3 (discussing increased state law penalties, including liquidated
damages in excess of wages owed for noncompliance with wage-and-hour
regulations).
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culture that reduces systematic miscalculation of wages.130  If violations
have already occurred, employers and their lawyers should focus on vigor-
ously challenging classification under Rule 23’s complex class action re-
quirements, rather than attempting to re-litigate Knepper and the inherent
incompatibility issue.131
V. CONCLUSION
For several years, the inherent incompatibility doctrine appeared to
be a promising strategy for attorneys fending off hybrid wage-and-hour
claims, but the doctrine now appears to be circling the drain.132 Knepper
conclusively resolved the question against inherent incompatibility in
cases where federal courts have original CAFA jurisdiction over state wage-
and-hour law claims.133  However, in hybrid actions that do not meet the
CAFA’s diversity requirements, the question of inherent incompatibility
remains technically unsettled.134  Nonetheless, the increased applicability
of the CAFA renders this narrow issue increasingly irrelevant.135  Further-
more, even in such narrow cases, the doctrine’s treatment in other circuit
courts does not bode well for employers defending against these ac-
tions.136  Thus, employers and their attorneys need to search for other
innovative strategies to stem the rising tide of group wage-and-hour
litigation.
130. See id. at 5 (discussing need for organization-wide training to avoid sus-
ceptibility, particularly among small businesses, to systematic failures to pay wages
due under statute).
131. See Cholis, supra note 8, at 433 (discussing futility of employers in Sev-
enth Circuit relying on inherent incompatibility doctrine after Ervin).
132. See Schneider & Willson, supra note 6, at *7 (noting substantial authority
on both sides of inherent incompatibility argument).
133. See Jason E. Reisman, There Goes the Neighborhood—Third Circuit Decides
FLSA “Opt-In” Collective Actions and State Law “Opt-Out” Class Actions Can Exist in the
Same Lawsuit, WAGE & HOUR DEF. INST. (Apr. 12, 2012), http://wagehourdefense.
wordpress.com/2012/04/12/there-goes-the/ (calling Knepper holding “fatal blow”
to employers defending against hybrid actions).
134. See Cholis, supra note 8, at 444 (“If the appellate circuits are to become as
divided as district courts, combined actions may soon warrant review by this na-
tion’s highest court.”).
135. For a discussion of the CAFA’s jurisdictional sweep and underlying pol-
icy objectives, see supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
136. For a discussion of the negative treatment of the inherent incompatibil-
ity doctrine at the appellate level, see supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text.
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